APRAP: Another Privacy Preserving RFID Authentication Protocol by Miyaji, Atsuko & Rahman, Mohammad Shahriar
APRAP: Another Privacy Preserving RFID
Authentication Protocol
Atsuko Miyaji
School of Information Science
Japan Advanced Institute of Science and Technology
1-1 Asahidai, Nomi, Ishikawa, Japan
Email: miyaji@jaist.ac.jp
Mohammad Shahriar Rahman
School of Information Science
Japan Advanced Institute of Science and Technology
1-1 Asahidai, Nomi, Ishikawa, Japan
Email: mohammad@jaist.ac.jp
Abstract—Privacy preserving RFID (Radio Frequency Iden-
tification) authentication has been an active research area in
recent years. Both forward security and backward security are
required to maintain the privacy of a tag, i.e., exposure of a
tag’s secret key should not reveal the past or future secret keys
of the tag. We envisage the need for a formal model for backward
security for RFID protocol designs in shared key settings, since
the RFID tags are too resource-constrained to support public key
settings. However, there has not been much research on backward
security for shared key environment since Serge Vaudenay in his
Asiacrypt 2007 paper showed that perfect backward security is
impossible to achieve without public key settings. We propose a
Privacy Preserving RFID Authentication Protocol for shared key
environment, APRAP 1, which minimizes the damage caused by
secret key exposure using insulated keys. Even if a tag’s secret key
is exposed during an authentication session, forward security and
‘restricted’ backward security of the tag are preserved under our
assumptions. The notion of ‘restricted’ backward security is that
the adversary misses the protocol transcripts which are needed
to update the compromised secret key. Although our definition
does not capture perfect backward security, it is still suitable for
effective implementation as the tags are highly mobile in practice.
We also provide a formal security model of APRAP. Our scheme
is more efficient than previous proposals from the viewpoint of
computational requirements.
I. INTRODUCTION
One of the main issues of RFID security and privacy has to
do with malicious tracking of RFID-equipped objects. While
tracking RFID tags is typically one of the key features and
goals of a legitimate RFID system, unauthorized tracking of
RFID tags is viewed as a major privacy threat. Both forward
and backward security are required to maintain the privacy
of the tag. Forward security means that even if the adversary
acquires the secret data stored in a tag, the tag cannot be traced
back using previously known messages [1], [8]. Backward
security means the opposite, i.e., even if the adversary acquires
the secret data stored in a tag, the tag cannot be traced using
subsequently known messages. In other words, exposure of a
tag’s secret should not reveal any secret information regarding
the past or the future of the tag. Moreover, indistinguishability
means that the values emitted by one tag should not be
distinguishable from the values emitted by other tags [8], [10].
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A. Related Work
Many privacy-preserving mutual RFID authentication
schemes have been proposed in recent years [4], [5], [6],
[9], [16], [14]. An authentication protocol for RFID from
EPCGlobal Class-1 Gen-2 standards was introduced by [5].
Both the authentication key and the access key are updated
after a successful session in order to provide forward security.
However, [16] showed that [5] is not backward- and forward-
secure, because an attacker that compromises a tag can identify
a tag’s past interactions from the previous communications and
the fixed EPC of the tag, and can also read the tag’s future
transactions. There are also some other privacy-preserving
RFID protocols that address untraceability and forward se-
curity [4], [6], [14]. However, all these protocols have the
same drawback, that is, they cannot provide backward security.
LK and SM schemes [9], [16] have recently described RFID
authentication schemes satisfying both forward and backward
security. However, [16] has been shown to be vulnerable to
an attack where an adversary breaks the forward security
[15]. The scheme proposed in [9] cannot provide backward
security if the current secret key is compromised [11]. Since
the adversary is able to trace the target tag at least during the
authentication immediately following compromise of the tag
secret, perfect backward security makes no sense. Therefore, a
minimum restriction should be imposed to achieve backward
security, such that the adversary misses the necessary protocol
transcripts to update the compromised key. Although this
assumption for backward security is true for certain classes
of privacy-preserving RFID protocols (i.e., for shared key
environment), it is clearly not true for some other cases. For
instance, Vaudenay shows an RFID protocol based on public-
key cryptography that is resistant to this attack [18]. However,
our notion of backward security is true for privacy-preserving
RFID protocols based on shared secrets that are updated on
each interaction between tag and reader, which is the focus
of this paper. Backward security is thus harder to achieve
than forward security in general, particularly under the very
constrained environment of RFID tags. However, backward
security is never less important than forward security in RFID
systems. In the case of target tracing, it suffices to somehow
steal the tag secret of a target and collect interaction messages
to trace the future behaviors of the particular target. Without
backward security, this kind of target tracing is trivial. In the
case of supply chain management systems, even a catastrophic
scenario may take place without backward security: if tag
secrets are leaked at some point of tag deployment or during
their time in the environment, then all such tags can be traced
afterwards. We thus envisage the need for a formal model
for backward security in RFID protocol designs (even if not
perfect), in addition to the well-recognized forward security.
B. Our Contribution
We propose APRAP, a privacy-preserving mutual RFID
authentication protocol for shared key environment which pro-
vides both forward and ‘restricted’ backward security through
key insulation. Even if a tag’s secret key is exposed during
an authentication session, forward security and ‘restricted’
backward security of the tag are preserved under our assump-
tions. The notion of ‘restricted’ backward security is that the
adversary misses the protocol transcripts needed to update the
compromised secret key. The protocol also provides indistin-
guishability between the responses of tags in order to provide
privacy of a tag. We also provide a formal security model to
design our privacy-preserving protocol. Our assumptions for
indistinguishability, and forward/restricted backward security
are similar to the assumptions made in previous work.
Organization of the paper: The remainder of this paper
is organized as follows: Section II presents the notations,
assumptions, the protocol model, and the security definitions.
Section III describes the protocol. Next, our scheme is eval-
uated in Section IV based on a security analysis and a com-
parison with previous work. Section V includes concluding
remarks.
II. PRELIMINARY
A. Notations
We use the following notations in the protocol description.
 - a one-way hash function, such that             .



and 

are -bit random numbers generated during time
period  by a tag and a server, respectively.  is a -bit
random number generated by a server. 

is a -bit session
key between a tag and a server during time period . 

is a
-bit random shared secret key between a tag and a server
during time period . 	  is a tag-specific master secret key,
stored by a legitimate server only. 

is -bit, generated from
	
  by the server during session .  and  are bitwise XOR
operation and concatenation of two bit strings, respectively. 
represents dividing a bit string into two equal parts.
B. Assumptions
A tag  is not tamper-resistant. Initially, it stores the secret
key 
 
which is updated after each authentication session. All
communication between a server and a reader is assumed to be
over a private and authentic channel. In this paper, we consider
Reader and Server as a single entity. Therefore, we use the
terms ‘Server’ or ‘S’ interchangeably in the text. The adversary
cannot compromise the server. The tag is assumed to be
vulnerable to repeated key exposures; specifically, we assume
that up to 
   periods can be compromised. Our goal is
to minimize the effect such compromises will have. When a
secret key is exposed, an adversary will be able to trace the tag
for period  until the next single secure authentication session.
Our notion of security is that this is the best an adversary can
do. In particular, the adversary will be unable to trace a tag
for any of the subsequent periods. It is assumed that hash and
PRNG take the same amount of execution time. Splitting and
concatenation operations take negligible amounts of time.
C. The Model
We design the model following the model proposed in [7].
However, our model is slightly different than that in [7]. We
assume a fixed, polynomial-size tag set        	 	 	   ,
and a server ‘Server’ as the elements of an RFID system.
A Server has information for  ’s authentication such as
tag’s secret key, master key, etc. Before the protocol is run
for the first time, an initialization phase occurs in both  	
and Server, where    	 	 	  . That is, each  	 
  
runs an algorithm  to generate the secret key 	, and Server
also saves these values in a database field. A key-updating
authentication scheme is a 5-tuple of poly-time algorithms

 
 , Auth(AuthT/AuthS) such that:
, the key generation algorithm, is a probabilistic algorithm
which takes as input a security parameter  , and the total
number of tags . It returns a master key 	 , and an initial
shared key 
 
for each tag.

 
, the partial key generation algorithm, is a deterministic
algorithm which takes as input an index  for a time period
(throughout, we assume      ), the master key 	  and
the secret key 

of a tag. It returns the partial secret key 

,
for time period .
, the session key generation algorithm, is a deterministic
algorithm which takes as input an index , part of the tag’s
secret key 

, and a part of the partial secret key 

. It returns
a shared session secret key 

for time period .
 , the tag key-update algorithm, is a deterministic algorithm
which takes as input an index , part of the tag’s secret key



, a part of the partial secret key 

, and a random 

. It
returns the tag’s secret key 
 
for time period    (and
erases 

, 

, 


).
Auth(AuthT/AuthS), the authentication message verification
algorithm, is a deterministic algorithm for a server (resp. tag)
which takes as input AuthT (resp. AuthS). It returns  or the
special symbol . AuthT/AuthS is as follows:
- AuthT/AuthS, the Tag (resp. Server) authentication mes-
sage generation algorithm, is a probabilistic algorithm for a tag
(resp. server) which takes as input a shared secret 

, a time
period , and random numbers 

and 

(or ) (

 

 


(or ), and 

are the inputs for the server). It returns 

(resp. 

) .
APRAP is used as one might expect. A server begins by
generating 	  
 
  
 
 , storing 	  on a server
(physically-secure device), and storing 
 
in both the server
and the tag. At the beginning of time period , the tag requests

 
 
 	
 
 

 from the server. Using 

, and 

, the tag
may compute the session secret key 

  


 


. This
key is used to create authentication messages sent during time
period . Both the tag and server update their shared secret by

 
  


 


 


. After computation of 
 
, the tag
must erase 

, and 

.
D. Security Definitions
Adversary ’s interaction with the RFID entities in the
network is modeled by sending the following queries to an
oracle  and receiving the result from . The queries in
our model follow [8] with some differences. We do not
need Reply*/Execute*, since we do not consider a tag to be
maintaining an internal state in our protocol. Also, we consider
server and reader as a single entity. So, we do not need
Forward
 
/Forward

and Auth queries. Instead, Reply, Reply’
perform the tasks of Forward
 
, Forward

, respectively. They
also serve the purpose of Auth(AuthT/AuthS).
 Query( 

): It calls server () and outputs 

of period .
 Query’( 	

 


): It calls tag ( 	) and outputs 

of period .
 Query


( ): It calls server () and outputs any random


.
 Reply( 

 

 Æ

): It calls  with input 

and outputs 

 Æ

for period . It uses AuthS algorithm. The output is forwarded
to  	.
 Reply’( 	

 


 

 Æ

 


): It calls  	 with input 

 

 Æ

and
outputs 

for period . It uses AuthT algorithm. The output
is forwarded to .
 Reply


( 	

 

 

 Æ

 


): It calls  	 with input


 

 Æ

and outputs 

for period . It uses AuthT
algorithm. The output is forwarded to .
 Execute( 	

 ): This query uses the algorithms   ,
Auth(AuthT/AuthS). It receives the protocol transcripts


 


 


 Æ

 


, and outputs them. This models the ad-
versary ’s eavesdropping of protocol transcripts. It has
the following relationships with the above queries: Execute
( 	

 ) = Query( 

) Query’( 	

 


)  Reply( 

 

 Æ

)
 Reply’( 	

 


 

 Æ

 


).
 Execute


( 	

 ): This query uses the algorithms

 
 , Auth(AuthT/AuthS). It receives the protocol
transcripts 

 


 Æ

 


 

, and outputs them. This models
the adversary ’s eavesdropping of protocol transcripts
except 

which is used for key update. It has the following
relationship with the above queries: Execute


( 	

 ) =
Query


( 	

 
)  Query’( 	

 


)  Reply( 

 

 Æ

) 
Reply


( 	

 

 

 Æ

 


).
 RevealSecret ( 	 ): This query uses the algorithm  . It
receives the tag’s  	 secret key 

, and outputs 

of period .
 Test ( 	 ): This query is allowed only once, at any time
during ’s execution. A random bit  is generated; if   ,
 is given transcripts corresponding to the tag, and if   ,
 receives a random value.
We now give the definitions through security games, rem-
iniscent of classic indistinguishability in a cryptosystem se-
curity game. We follow [8] to define indistinguishability and
forward security. The success of  in the games is subject
to ’s advantage in distinguishing whether  has received an
RFID tag’s real response or a random value. The next two
games represent the attack games for forward security and
restricted backward security, respectively.
Definition 1: Indistinguishability
 Phase 1: Initialization
(1) Run algorithm           .
(2) Set each tag  	’s secret key as 	, where

	

     
 
     

.
(3) Save each  	’s 	 generated in step (1) in Server’s field.
 Phase 2: Learning
(1)  executes Query( 

), Query’( 	

 


),
Reply( 

 

 Æ

), Reply’( 	

 


 

 Æ

 


), and Execute
( 	

 ) oracles for all    tags, except the   
   used
in challenge phase.
 Phase 3: Challenge
(1)  selects a challenge tag   from   .
(2)  executes Query( 

), Query’( 	

 


),
Reply( 

 

 Æ

), Reply’( 	

 


 

 Æ

 


), and Execute
( 	

 ) oracles for  , where          .
(3)  calls the oracle Test(  ).
(4) For the ’s Test, Oracle  tosses a fair coin  
   ;
let     .
i. If   ,  is given the messages corresponding to  ’s
-th instance.
ii. If   ,  is given random values.
(5)  outputs a guess bit .
 wins if   
The advantage of any PPT adversary  with compu-
tational boundary 
 
 
 
 

 , where 
 
is the number of
Execute, 
 
is the number of Reply, 

is the number of Reply’
and  is the security parameter, is defined as follows:



 
   

	 

The scheme provides indistinguishability if and only if the
advantage of 

 
is negligible.
Definition 2: Forward Security
 Phase 1: Initialization
(1) Run algorithm           .
(2) Set each tag  	’s secret key as 	, where

	

     
 
     

.
(3) Save each  	’s 	 generated in step (1) in Server’s field.
 Phase 2: Learning
(1)  executes Query( 

), Query’( 	

 


),
Reply( 

 

 Æ

), Reply’( 	

 


 

 Æ

 


), and Execute
( 	

 ) oracles for all    tags, except for the   
  
used in challenge phase.
 Phase 3: Challenge
(1)  selects a challenge tag   from   .
(2)  executes Query( 

), Query’( 	

 


),
Reply( 

 

 Æ

), Reply’( 	

 


 

 Æ

 


), Execute ( 	

 ),
and RevealSecret(  ) oracles for   for  ’s -th instance.
(3)  calls the oracle Test(   ).
(4) For the ’s Test, Oracle  tosses a fair coin  
   ;
let     .
i. If   ,  is given the messages corresponding to  ’s
 -th instance.
ii. If   ,  is given random values.
(5)  executes the oracles for    tags of   , except


, like in the learning phase.
(6)  outputs a guess bit .
 wins if   
The advantage of any PPT adversary  with compu-
tational boundary 
 
 
 
 

 , where 
 
is the number of
Execute, 
 
is the number of Reply, 

is the number of Reply’
and  is the security parameter, is defined as follows:




   

	 

The scheme is forward secure if and only if the advantage
of 


is negligible.
Definition 3: Restricted Backward Security 1
 Phase 1: Initialization
(1) Run algorithm           .
(2) Set each tag  	’s secret key as 	, where

	

     
 
     

.
(3) Save each  	’s 	 generated in step (1) in Server’s field.
 Phase 2: Learning
(1) 
 executes Query


( 	

 
), Query’( 	

 


),
Reply( 

 

 Æ

), Reply


( 	

 

 

 Æ

 


), and
Execute


( 	

 ) oracles for all    tags, except for
the   
   used in challenge phase.
 Phase 3: Challenge
(1) 
 selects a challenge tag   from  .
(2) 
 executes Query


( 	

 
), Query’( 	

 


),
Reply( 

 

 Æ

), Reply


( 	

 

 

 Æ

 


),
Execute


( 	

 ), and RevealSecret(  ) oracles for  ’s -th
instance.
(3) 
 calls the oracle Test(   ).
(4) For the 
’s Test, Oracle  tosses a fair coin
 
   ; let     .
i. If   , 
 is given the messages corresponding to


’s  th instance.
ii. If   , 
 is given random values.
(5) 
 executes oracles for   tags of   , except  ,
like in the learning phase.
(6) 
 outputs a guess bit .
 wins if   
The advantage of any PPT adversary 
 with compu-
tational boundary 

 
 
 


 , where 

is the number of
Execute


, 
 
is the number of Reply, 


is the number of Reply


and  is the security parameter, is defined as follows:



	

   

	 

1Since once obtaining the tag secret by RevealSecret,    takes all
the power of the tag itself and thus can trace the target tag at least during
the authentication immediately following the attack. In typical RFID system
environments, tags and readers operate only at short communication range
and for a relatively short period of time. Thus, the minimum restriction for
backward security is such that the adversary misses the protocol transcripts
needed to update the compromised secret key. The same restriction was
applied in [16]. On the other hand, [9] claimed that there should exist some
non-empty gap not accessible by the adversary between the time of a reveal
query and the attack time. But this restriction was shown to be inadequate to
provide backward security by [11].
The scheme is restricted backward secure if and only if the
advantage of 


	

is negligible.
Definition 4: Privacy-Preserving Protocol
A protocol is privacy-preserving when indistinguishability,
forward security, and restricted backward security are guaran-
teed for any PPT adversary  with computational boundary

 
 
 
 

 

 


 , where 
 
is the number of Execute, 
 
is
the number of Reply, 

is the number of Execute


, 

is the
number of Reply’, 


is the number of Reply


and  is the
security parameter.
III. PROTOCOL DESCRIPTION
Table I describes the protocol building blocks, and Fig. 1
describes the authentication session. During any session , the
following steps take place between a tag and a server:
1. The server sends a random challenge 

to the tag.
2. The tag replies to the server with a random 

.
3. The server splits 

into 

and 

, and 

into  

and


 

. It then generates 

from 	  and 

by  

	
 
 

,
where  

is the -th time run for   . 	  is used to generate


so that no other entities other than a valid server can
generate 

. Even if an adversary compromises 

, it can not
generate  for any subsequent sessions using only that 

. 


is used as a random number for server authentication, and 

is used as the partial key for the present session. The server
computes 

  




 





, and Æ

 



. The server
sends 

and Æ

to the tag.
4. After receiving 

and Æ

, the tag splits 

into 

and 

,
and extracts 

from Æ

. The tag then authenticates the server
by verifying 

. If the server is authenticated as a legitimate
server, the tag splits 

into  

and   

, and 

into 

and 

. The tag now computes the session secret key 

by
concatenating 

and 

. It then computes 

  





 

,
and updates its own secret key to 
 
by  




 


. The
tag sends 

to the server, and erases 

, 


, and 

from its
memory. The updated 
 
is used for the next authentication
session.
5. After the server receives 

, it authenticates the tag by
verifying 

. The server then updates the secret key to 
 
of the tag by  




 


. This updated 
 
is stored in
the server database, and is used for the next authentication
session.2
IV. EVALUATION
A. Security Analysis
Due to page limitation, we omit the security proofs and put
them in the full version.
Theorem 1: The protocol  = (,  , ,  , Auth(AuthT/
AuthS) provides indistinguishability for any PPT adversary
2Note that it is imperative for the respective times taken by authentication
success and failure to be as close as possible to prevent obvious timing attacks
by malicious readers (aimed at distinguishing among the two cases)[17]. For
this reason, even if the authentication by a tag is failed, it should generate
random numbers instead of simply failure, to make the cases of success and
failure indistinguishable from each other.
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Fig. 1. Our Scheme: APRAP
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Theorem 2: The protocol  = (,  , ,  , Auth(AuthT/
AuthS) is forward secure for any PPT adversary  with
computational boundary 
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is the number
of Execute, 
 
is the number of Reply, 

is the number of
Reply’ and  is the security parameter.
Theorem 3: The protocol  = (,  , ,  , Auth(AuthT/
AuthS) is restricted backward secure for any PPT adversary
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Theorem 4: The protocol  = (,  , ,  , Auth(AuthT/
AuthS) is privacy-preserving for any PPT adversary  with
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B. Discussion and Comparison With Previous Work
Deursen et al. [21] discussed a weakness of the indistin-
guishability definition of [8]. Deursen et al. argued that, to
achieve location privacy, the adversary must not be able to
distinguish one tag’s response from other tags’ responses, but it
is not necessary that the adversary cannot distinguish the tag’s
response from any arbitrary value. However, our definition can
be modified according to their argument. For that purpose, the
oracle queries should run on all but two tags which are used
for the challenge phase. All the adversary needs to do is to
distinguish between those two tags. In fact, our assumption
about the tag responses is such that the output of the one-way
hash functions are indistinguishable from a random bit string
of equal length.
In [2], Bellare et al. show that it is impossible to achieve
public-channel key insulated security in the face of an active
adversary (who can compromise the secret key). Although
we follow the idea of key insulation from [7], assuming
passive adversary in case of RFID (who can eavesdrop only)
is not practical, as it is easy for an adversary to break
into a tag’s memory. Considering this, the assumptions made
in our scheme (as well as in [16]) are more realistic to
achieve restricted backward security, and the other features
as well. However, many of the existing mutual authentication
protocols may support restricted backward security under our
assumption ([3], [19], [17] to name a few). But [3], [19]
require a tag to remember too many secrets. Moreover, [3],
[19] cannot provide forward security as shown by [13] and
[22], respectively. Again, [17] requires more computation than
our scheme, and it does not provide reader authentication.
Nevertheless, none of these protocols came up with a formal
model of backward security (even if not perfect).
Although it is not the primary target of our proposed pro-
tocol, it is also possible to prevent desynchronization attacks
[20] in our protocol to some extent. We consider the following
type of attack: If the last message is blocked, the tag updates
the shared secret key, 

, but the server doesn’t. The server
and tag are no longer able to communicate successfully. To
prevent such an attack, the server has to remember the last
valid authentication session transcripts and the secret values.
When a server receives some random number instead of a
valid authentication value from a tag, the server updates itself
using the information from the last valid session, and tries
again to get synchronized with the tag. Although the question
of scalability is an issue here, this approach can help avoid
such desynchronization attacks in a limited way (of course
the system gets desynchronized if the last messages from two
consecutive sessions are blocked). Even though the system
gets desynchronized, an adversary can not trace a tag from
its desynchronized state, since the responses of a tag are
always pseudorandom, hence indistinguishable. However, we
are more concerned with ‘exposure resilience’ of the secret
key and its effect on the authentication protocol, rather than
the desynchronization attacks. Providing full resistance against
desynchronization attacks is a separate issue.
We compare our work, based on security properties and
computational cost, with LK and SM schemes in Table II
below. According to [8], a scheme must satisfy both forward
security and indistinguishability in order to achieve ‘strong
location privacy’. If a scheme satisfies indistinguishability
only, the scheme is ‘weak location private’. [15] has shown
that SM scheme is not forward secure. So, SM scheme is weak
location private only, whereas our scheme is strong location
private. SM scheme furthermore does not give any formal
security model for indistinguishability and forward security.
Regarding computational requirements, our protocol requires
a simple one-way hash function, random number generation
and the XOR operation. We use a simple hash function like
SQUASH [12] to achieve forward security for the tag. This
requires around 1K gates.
As the server needs to authenticate itself first to a tag, the
server must broadcast the authentication messages to the tags.
Since the server does not know the id of the tag that it wants
to authenticate, the server has to compute and broadcast the
authentication messages for all the tags in its storage. We
assume that the server has enough resource to perform such
computation. On the other hand, a tag receiving the broadcast
messages has to find a match with it’s verification value.
Although computing the verification value is always constant,
finding a match increases the required computations according
to the number of broadcast messages in the worst case. As
stated earlier, such a scenario is unavoidable when we require
that a server should authenticate itself first to a tag. We say
that our scheme is more suitable for an environment where
the reader must read a number of tags at a time (inventory
management) and/or where there are not too many tags (library
with a few thousand books).
TABLE II
PERFORMANCE COMPARISON WITH PREVIOUS WORKS
schemes ind. for. sec. back. sec. tag’s comp. tag’s storage
LK [9]   
 2 XOR, 5 hash 384 bits
SM [16]  
  6 XOR, 4 hash 128 bits
APRAP
  
1 XOR, 4 hash 128 bits
 assuming each secret key is 128 bits long; hash functions and PRNG
require the same computational resources; ind.: indistinguishability; for. sec.:
forward security; back. sec.: restricted backward security;

: the property is
satisfied; 
: the property is not satisfied
V. CONCLUSION
We have proposed APRAP, a privacy-preserving mutual
RFID authentication protocol for shared key environment. The
protocol uses two different keys for mutual authentication.
The server sends a random partial key (generated from a
master secret key 	 ) to a tag. The tag generates the
session key  to authenticate itself to the server. The tag’s
secret key  is updated using a partial key received from
the server. As  is purely fresh for every time period, the
tag’s security is guaranteed for all other time periods (both
for the past and future) under our assumptions. We show that
our scheme is computationally more efficient than the SM
and LK schemes. Our protocol satisfies indistinguishability,
and achieves both forward and restricted backward security
through key-insulation. We provide a formal security model
of the proposed protocol as well.
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